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I.  Introduction
The web of trade and payments arrangements binding countries of East and
Central  Europe  under the  Council  of  Mutual  Economic  Assistance (CMEA) 1 agreements
is  incompatible with  these  countries  recent  commitments  to  move  towards
liberalized trade and currency convertibility.  The importance of trade with
other CMEA members in these countries' total trade however, and the apparent
desire  of  the  USSR  and  others  to  denominate  all  future mutual  trade  at
international prices poses a number of problems  of transition for the countries
of East and Central Europe.
Three broad problems can be identified:  First, the breakdown of the CMEA
arrangements has led to a serious  breakdown of trade relations  and reduction of
trade  volume among former  CMEA  members.  Countries  are no longer feeling obliged
to abide by CMEA constraints;  yet because of currency inconvertibility  and the
absence of a free  market system, trade transactions  are hampered.  The question
then arises  as to  what interim  arrangements  can  be introduced  to facilitate  trade
pari passu  with other systemic  reforms  which are  being introduced  at a different
pace  in various countries.  Second, denomination of  international trade at
international prices  implies changes  in the terms-of-trade for each of the
countries  in  the  system.  Recent  estimates  have  indicated  that  in  these
circumstances, the  USSR's terms-of-trade  would improve  significantly  because of
1  The CMEA was founded in 1949  by Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union. East Germany joined in 1950, and Albania
was a temporary  member. Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam joined in later  years.-2-
the relative under-valu t.on of energy products, iLs  main export to the CMEA.2
To the extent that payments among these countries  (including the USSR) are
settled in  hard  currencies, it is  a-  a  anticipated,  that such  a shift  will result
in raising the financing requirc ,nts for countries of East and Central Europe
at a time when  they already suffer from overall foreign exchange shortages.
Third, recognizing that full currency convertibility  may not be reached for all
countries in the near term, but that continuation of the old CMEA arrangements
is also impossiDle, the question is what  interim payments arrangements among
these countries and between them and the USSR are desirable.
The purpose of this  paper is to  discuss the  possible interim institutional
arrangements for trade of payments among previous CMEA members and how such
arrangements can contribute to addressing the emerging payments imbalances.
2The estimates include Oblath and Tarr (1991),  Rosati (1990),  Marrese
(forthcoming)  and Kenen (1990).-3-
II. Trade Arrangements in the Post-CMEA ERA
A.  Legacy of Central Planning and CMEA Trading
Trade within the CMEA was historically co.kducted  as an outgrowth of the
central planning process. Under the planning mechanism, in East and Central
European  countries  and  the  Soviet  Union,  enterprises  were given  quantity  targets,
and  prices did not  play a role  in resource  allocation.  Total imports  and exports
were coordinated under the plan, since trade according to market forces  would
be very disruptive to the plan given that prices were so misaligned with world
prices.  Even when centtal planning was  formally abandoned, as in Hungary in
1968, price controls, price equalization, or other taxes and  subsidies also
resulted in a seriously  misaligned pattern of relative  prices.  Finally, forei,n
trade organizations (FTOs)  were given a state  monopoly on the import  and export
of goods, which prevented arbitrage on the distorted prices.
The  essential feature  of trade  within the  CMEA  was the  bilateral  agreements
(or protocols) between  the countries that participate  in the CMEA.  These
annually negotiated agreements obligated the two signing gc.vernments  to export
and import to each other specified  quantities of particular goods.  Enterprises
were then required  by their  government  to supply  goods for  the  purpose of  meeting
the  export  requirement  of the protocol.  Upon  delivery of  the  goods,  the
commercial bank account of the exporting enterprise was credited in domestic
currency by its own central bank, Consequently, the customer of the producing
enterprise  was not a foreign firm,  but its own government which both placed the
order for  the goods and paid the  enterprise.  Moreover, if  the firm  was obligated-4-
under the  plan to provide  goods for  export,  it felt  justified  in asking  for
subsidies  if  it incurred  losses  ir.  roduction.
For  trade  within  the  CMEA,  the  unit  of  account  was  the  transferable  rouble
(TR).  These TR were, in principle,  redeemable  for goods from the partner
countries;  in  fact,  when  denominated  in  TR,  trade  was supposed  to  be bilaterally
balanced.  In recent  years, however,  several  East European  countries  have
accumulated  significant  export  surpluses  in  TR.  This  was due to two types  of
opportunism  in  trade.  First,  countries  failed  to  meet  their  delivery  obligations
under the protocols.  During 1989 and 1990, the Soviet  Union was reducing
deliveries  as  domestic  shortages  and  production  problems  increased.  Another  type
of  opportunism  occurred  at  the  transactions  level. Since  firms  received  payment
from  their  own  government,  firms  found  it in  their  own interest  to export  when
it was not in the interest  of  the country. Enterprises  often  found it  more
profitable  to use resources  bargaining  with the government  than  attempting  to
be a  more efficient  market  oriented  enterprise.
B.  Desirable  Features  of a  New  Trade  Regime  in  East  and  Central  Europe
The  ultimate  objective  of  countries  in  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  must  be
to establish a trading system  unfettered  by the controls  and distortions
characterized  by the CMEA regime. In such  a system,  trade  policy  would rely
primarily  on  tariffs  and  use  of  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  would  be  minimized.
Firms  will  be free  to  engage  in  international  trade  with  agents  of their  choice.
Some  countries,  e.g.,  Poland,  have  already  more  or less  reached  that  objective,
regarding  trade  outside  the  CMEA. Others  are  committed  to  moving  rapidly  in  that
direction. The situation  in some  others,  in particular  the Soviet  Union,  is
still  uncertain  and  market  reforms  may take some  time to introduce. In this5-
environment,  many  .1 uestions  arise  as  to  -rhat  reforms  are  immediately  needed  and
what interim  trade  arrangements  are requirea  to introduce  to facilitate  trade
with other  East  and  Central  European  count:.-,es  and  especially  the  Soviet  Union
who  are lagging  in the  implementation  of  market  reforms.
As  to  the  reforms  needed  immediately,  the  following  steps  need  to  be  taken.
First,  of course,  it  is  necessary  to  undertake  wide  ranging  reforms  of the  price
system. Without  such reforms,  trade  reforms  are not likely  to be in and  of
themselves  meaningful. Second,  the state  granted  monopoly  on trading  of the
foreign  trade  organizations  in the  CMEA  area should  be liberalized.  Otherwise
prices  to enterprises  can be distorted  by the FTOs.  This has been done in
principle  in  most  countries. But  in  practice  oligopolistic  structures  in trade
continue  to  prevail.
Third,  price equalization  practices  musc be abolished. Such practices
prevent  resource  reallocation  in  accordance  with comparati'e  advantage.
Fourth,  countries  in  East  and  Central  Europe  should  develop  the  legal  basis
to impose  product specific  tariffs  or export taxes provided they are not
discriminatory  and  consistent  with the  GATT.  Export  taxes  are  not  recommended,
but  may  be necessary  in cases  where  the  domestic  product  is subsi.  ~d  and  the
subsidy  applies  on all  production.  A prominent  case  to  consider  is  the  case  of
agricultural  production.  The  price  of  the  export  in  some  countries  may  be less
than  the  cost of production,  leading  to  welfare  reducing  exports.  The optimal
policy  is to reduce  the  subsidy and  allow  exports;  but in  the  presence  of  the
subsidy,  an export  tax  may  be required  on  all  exports  (not  just  CMEA).
Fifth,  to encourage  product  and  cost-saving  technological  development  in
enterprise  decision-making,  it is necessary  to allow  exporting  or importing
enterprises  to deal  directly  with  the  agents  in  the  other  countries  with  wbich-6-
they are  buying or selling,  to enter into  contracts  and to  bear the r!sk of  their
contracts.  This  can only  be  accomplished  if  the  governmental  obligation  to  supply
to or purchase items from other countties is discontinued. Thus, an essential
feature of  a  desireable  trade  regime  for East  and  Central  Europe  is  the
termination of the state determined quantity or price determination under thie
framework of the protocols.
Some have  suggested that CMEA trade should be reformed by having the
governments conduct trade in dollar terms at world market prices. The concept
of  governments  negotiating trade  at  world  market  prices is  difficult  to  implement
for products that are subject to quality differences. The exporting government
will claim that its product is of high quality. Prices in  market economies are
normally  determined through  negotiation  at  the level  of the  firm,  and if  the firm
does not like the price it is free to seek another offer. Through'seeking or
obtaining the best ofier on world markets, the world market price for products
of a  particular quality is  found.  When the  government  intervenes  in  decentralized
decision-making regarding the nature of the contract (such as steel reference
prices or  agricultural  policies in  the  European  Community)  it is  usually regarded
as  a  barrier  to  trade. The  essential point  is  that the  government cannot
substitute for the market  in  the determination of market  prices.  Thus, an
essential reform of CMEA should be to remove governments from the process of
determining the prices and quantities at which the trade will be conducted. It
will then become redundant to suggest that trade be conducted at world market
prices.
In the  event  that  partner  countries refuse  to  allow  direct  negotiation  with
their enterprises, that should not deter unilateral action by governments who
wish to reform  their own  policies. The argument  has been raised that  because the-7-
Soviet  Union  is not  moving  forcefully  to establish  a market  economy,  East and
Central  European  countries  cannot  allow  their  own  enterprises  to  negotiate  with
agents  in  the  USSR  such  as FTOs. Austria  and  Finland,  however,  have  shown  that
small,  market  oriented  countries  can  successfully  trade  with  centrally  oriented
economies  without  introducing  central  concrol  in  their  own  economies. 3 The  USSR
presents  prices  to these  countries  at which it  will sell its  exports  and buy
imports. They,  in  turn,  would  maximize  their  gains  from  tradL  with the  USSR  by
allowing  their  firms  tc  trade  with  the  USSR  based  on  the  prices  for  exports  and
imports,  and  the  financial  arrangements,  negotiated  with  the  relevant  USSR  agent.
It  does  not  matter  to  these  countries  that  the  price  bid  or  offered  by the USSR
may be distorted  by central  planning. 4
In the  context  of discussions  on new  trade  arrangements,  some  countries,
e.g. the Soviet  Union,  have requested  the continuation  of intergovernmental
protocol  lists,  which could be used to manage trade  as in the past. It is
desireable  that East and Central  European  governments  agree to nothing  more
binding than "indicative"  lists of products.  If a product appears on the
indicative  list  the  government  only  commits  to  freely  allow  the  import  and  export
of the  product.  This  would involve  the removal  of the  product  from licensing
requirements  or the  rapid  or routine  licensing  of products  on the  lists.
Trade  in  products  that  are  not  on the  lists  should  be  permitted  to  occur,
because  placing  the  product  on the lists  only  mp.-.is  a relaxation  of licensing
and  a'cess  to foreign  exchange  for  products  on the  lists,  not a restriction  of
3  See  Oblath  and  Pete (1985).
4For  example,  if  the  delivered  price  of Soviet  oil  to  East and  Central
European  countries  is low  by international  standards,  their  enterprises  will
attempt  to  buy it.  and  it is in the  interest  of the  government  to  allow  them
to  do so.-8-
licensing  for  others.  It is crucial,  however,  that  the  presence  of the  product
on the list should  not in aiiy  way obligate  the government  or a particular
enterprise  to supply  the  product.  An enterprise  that  wishes  to sell  a product
will  need to  find  a  buyer  in  the  other  country  and  enter  into  a contract.  Trade
based  on  indicative  lists  has  been  employed  in  the  trade  between  the  Soviet  Union
and  Finland  for  a number  of years. 5
Finally,  true hard currency  settlement  will be the'  best mechanism  for
solving  the problem  of unredeemable  surpluses.  Individual  enterprises  should
negotiate the  financial  arrangements  of  the transaction  with the foreign
enterprise  and  bear  the  risk.  Thus,  we recommend  hat  trade  be  conducted  in  hard
currency  and all  deficits  be settled  in  hard  currency.  Due to the  possibility
of opportunism  by foreign  governments,  the settlement  period  or credit  limit
between  countries  would  have  to  be carefully  restri.ted.  An extensive  system  of
bilateral  credit  arrangements  could  lead  to the  proliferation  of  quantitative
restraints  on  trade  such  as  cheracterized  the  trade  in  Western  Europe  around  1950
(see  below,  Section  V).
In summary,  if these  features  are implemented  East and  Central  European
enterprises  will directly  conclude  contracts  with foreign firms (or other
authorized  agents)  in the  former  CMEA  countries,  be under  no state  obligation,
and  the  role  of licenses  and foreign  trading  organizations  would  be  minimized.
This  trading  environment  would  differ  from  the  CMEA  arrangements  because  there
would  be  enterprise  autonomy,  trade  would  be  conducted  according  to  world  prices,
and  settlements  would  be  made in  convertible  currency.  Thp  principle  difference
between  this  approach  and  trade  between  firms  in  market  economies  would  be that
5The  proposed  system  is  not identical  to  the  Soviet-Finnish  system,  in
which  trade  was denominated  in roubles  and  no hard  currency  was  exchanged.  See
Oblath  and  Pete (1985).-9-
since  many of the  East and  Central  European  countries  do not  have convertible
currencies,  transactions  would  be denominated  and  settled  in  the  hard  currency
of third  countries. In  effect,  this  practice  is  quite  common  among  developing
countries.
C.  Potential  Trade  Deficit  Problems  and  Transition  Arrangements
In the  final  months  of  1990,  it  became  apparent  that  switch-over  costs  to
hard  currency  trade  in the  former  CMEA  area  may  be more severe  than  previously
anticipated.  The lack  of a decision  in the  USSR regarding  the  method  by  which
foreign  exchange  will  be allocated,  resulted  in  the  inability  of  USSR  importers
to sign  contracts  with  East  and  Central  European  exporters,  despite  "demand'  by
USSR buyers. it should  be emphasized  that to the extent that the central
authority  is losing  its  control  of the  USSR  economy,  it  becomes  more  crucial  to
convert to hard currency  trade and enterprise  to enterprise  transactions.
Otherwise  an  expo-ting  enterprise  in  the  USSR  will  be  reluctant  to  export  to  East
and  Central  Europe,  because  the  payment  it  receives  under  an intergovernmental
protocri  is the  delivery  of goods  through  the  plan,  rather  tnan  the immediate
and  more  certain  payment  of  hard  currency  directly. 6 Thus,  many  representatives
of East and Central European  govetnments  are quite concerned  about trade
deficits,  especially  a  bilateral  trade  deficit  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  various
transition  arrangements  have been discussed.  The principal  proposals  have
focused  cn  the  establishment  of a  variety  of clearing  and  payments  arrangements
which  are  the subject  of the  remainder  of the  paper.
6Thus,  when production  of oil  declined  in  1990,  Soviet  deliveries  to East
and  Central  Europe  declined  more than  proportionately.- 10  -
III.  Institutional  Alternatives  for  Paym.ents  Arrangements
It is widely agreed  that the first  best arrangement  for international
payments  in the  post  CMEA  era  would  be for  countries  to  move to full  currency
convertibility.  Recognizing  that his  might  take  time  to  achieve  and  that  the
pace of reforms  will  vary among  countries,  two  basic  alternatives  for  interim
monetary  cooperation  have  been  suggested:  (a)  simple  clearing  arrangements  with
a  relatively  short  interval  between  settlement  dates  (one-three  months)  and  the
provision  of solely  interim  finance;  (b)  payments  arrangements,  where  clearing
is supplemented  by a facility  that  provides  short (e.g.,  one-year)  or perhaps
even  medium  term  credit  to the  participants  --  similar  after  a fashion  to the
European  Payments  Union.7 For  each  of  these  fundamental  alternatives  there  are
variations  with respect  to specific  features  such  as  financial  contributions  of
non-participants,  the  credit  terms,  the  terms  of settlement,  and the  types  of
transa-tions  covered.  The question  is  what are the  potential  advantages  and
disadvantages  of such  arrangements  for  trade  among  former  CMEA  members.
A  clearing  arrangement  between two or more countries  establishes  a
centralized system of  mutually compensated settlements for  intra-group
transactions,  using  an  agreed  upon  unit  of  account. Settlement  of  net  balances
arising  from  transactions  (which  could  include  trade  'n  both  goods  and  services)
would  be  made periodically  in agreed  upon  convertible  currencies.  For  example
in  the  Central  American  Common  Market  (CACM)  clearing  arrangement,  participants
had agreed  to extend  credit  up to $12  million  to  each  participant,  with a six
month  settlement  period  and  settlements  made  in  U.S.  dollars.  Shorter  settlement
70ther  arrangements,  for  example  reserve-pooling  are  also  possible,  but
require  a far  greater  monetary  and  economic  integration  that  is currently
being  considered.periods have  been  in place  in other clearing arrangements among developing
countries.
The basic distinction  between a  payments union and a clearing arrangement
is the provision of credit for more than an interim period (i.e., exceeding 3
months).  The union could be based on mutual credit extended only among the
participating members, or could be financed in part by outside contributors.
The European Payments  Union  was such  a  mixed arrangement,  with the  United States
contributing $100 million but not otherwise participating in the arrangement.
The use of outside assistance allows creditors to be paid in part or in full,
with  larger credit extended to the debtors than would be otherwise possible
(Michalopoulos (1973)].
The apparent success of the EPU has  led to repeated efforts to create
similar instit tions in other countries.  As  Kenen  (1990) has  emphasized,
however,  the EPU  trading region encompassed the  entire  sterling area,  the
overseas dependencies of France, Belgium and Portugal,  and the  Western European
members themselves  accounted for  35 percent  of  world exports  in 1950, as opposed
to less than 4 percent for the CMEA in 1988. Thus, despite the focus on the EPU
as a model for an Eastern European Payments Union  (EEPU), the more  relevant
historical  experience is  from  the  developing  world,  where trade  within the  unions
has represented a small portion of world trade. The most successful of these
arrangements  was the one  put in  place in  Central  America in  support of the CACM.
It functioned, with some outside assistance, for over two decades, until it de
facto suspended operation in 1987 for reasons to be discussed later.  Payments- 12  -
arrangements  have also  been in place  in francophone  Africa  as part  of the  CFA
arrangements.8
IV.  The  Role  of Clearing  Arran8ements  in  Post-CMEA  East  and  Central  Europe
Clearing arrangements  have been established  typically in a  regional
context,  among  countries  with  inconvertible  currencies.  The  clearing  arrangement
is  intended  to  generate  two  kinds  of  benefits  to  its  members. First,  there  would
be some savings  in foreign  exchange.  because  each country  would  require  fewer
liquid  foreign  exchange  reserves  to  back  its  trade  and  because  transaction  costs
arising  from  payments  through  third  country  banks  would  be reduced. The  second
and, by far the most importart  expected  benefit is the support  of mutual
expansion  of  trade. Clearing  can  be  expected  to stimulate  intra-group  trade  if
two broad conditions  are  sat.-sfied: (a) exchange rates are  overvalued
substantially  and  in  different  degrees  and  can  be expected  to  continue  to  be  so
for  an  indefinite  period  and,  as  is  typical,  there  is  foreign  exchange  rationing;
(b)  trade  is  hampered  by the  existence  of  strictly  bilateral  arrangements  which
have led  to inconvertible  balances. That  is,  since  under  the  CMEA  protocols  a
surplus  earned  in  trade  with  one  country  could  not  be used  to import  goods  from
another  CMQA  country,  trade  was  bilateral.  The  question  then  is  what  contribution
8A  number  of earlier  proposals  in the  ESCAP  region  (which  were not
implemented)  called  for  a  payments  union  financed  without  outside  credit
(although  the  option  of contributions  from  developed  countries  was left  open),
on  the  basis  of initial  positions. In a  payments  union  based  on initial
positions,  credit  is  provided  only  with respect  to increments  in  trade  among
member  countries. Thus,  a  country  would  be asked  to  participate  in  the
arrangement  not  with respect  to  all  its  trade,  but  only  with respect  to
changes  from  the  original  position. How these  original  positions  are
established  presumably  would  be the  subject  of  negotiations  among  the  members
[Hichalopoulos,  (1973)].- 13 -
clearing  arrangements  among  two  or more  East  and Central  Europe  countries  can
make at this  point  to facilitating  mutual  trade  and  payments.
Without  doubt  a  clearing  arrangement  can  provide  some  very  limited  foreign
exchange savings by  reducing transaction  costs.  The  key  issue is the
relationship  between  clearing  and  international  trade. At present,  trade  among
CMEA countries  in East and Central  Europe  is hampered  by the maze of CMEh
bilateral  agreements. It is  unclear,  however,  whether  these  countries  now  -aim
or should  aim  to increase  trade  with  each  other. While  it  is impossible  to say
for  sure  because  of the  price  distortions  inherent  in  the  CMEA  arrangements,  it
is possible that, if prices and  trade among these countries  were  fully
liberalized,  they  would trade less rather  than  more with each other.  Thus,
expansion  of mutual  trade,  a key  objective  in  previous  clearing  arrangements,
is not necessarily  present in the former  CMEA countries.  Instead  the  main
concern  is  how  to  cushion  the  effect  of  possible  reductions  in  their  exports  to
the Soviet  Union  and  possibly  adverse  terms-of-trade  effects  of valuing  trade
with the  latter  in international  prices.
At the same time, several  countries  in East and Central Europe  have
indicated  a commitment  to take steps to introduce  some degree  of currency
convertibility.  Poland  has  essentially  done  so  already. Hungary  is  moving  in
that  direction. Czechoslovakia  has indicated  a desire  to achieve  substantial
convertibility  in 1991.  Others,  most  notably  the  USSR, are lagging. To the
extent  that these countries  introduce  more realistic  exchange  rates and a
significant  degree  of  convertibility,  the  contribution  of  clearing  arrangements
would  be reduced.  For  example,  if  all  CMEA  countries  were  to  introduce  a  system
of foreign  exchange  auctions  or a variant  thereof  that would provide  firms
foreign  exchange  for  the  bulk  of their  foreign  trade  transactions,  it  is  unclear- 14 -
why  a  clearing  mechanism  for  intra-group  trade  would  be  necessary: 9 Firms  could
buy the foreign  exchange  at the  auction  and  then  use it to purchase  goods  and
services denominated in international  prices in  any  market.
Some  officials  have  expressed  a  preference  for  a  negotiated  amount  of  USSR
hard  currency  purchases  of  their  products.  The  idea  is  that  an  East  and  Central
European  country  will  agree  to purchase  a specified  value  of USSR  goods  and  in
return  the  USSR  would  agree  to purchase  the  same  specified  v&lue  of Hungarian
goods.  It is important  to emphasize  that if the country  authorities  want to
negotiate  a level  of aggregate  USSR purchases  of the country's  exports  as a
mechanism  for ensuring  USSR demand,  those aggregate  hard currency  purchases
should  not  limit  the  autonomy  of the  country's  enterprises  in  their  trade  with
the  Soviet  Union.  It is  also  crucial  that  such  USSR  hard  currency  purchases  not
be  targeted  in  bilateral  negotiations  toward  specific  products.  The  latter  would
imply  protection  of specific  country  exports  in the  USSR  market  at the  expense
of other  industries  with no such  guarantee.
Moreover,  if there  are bilateral  agreements  reached  on aggregate  hard
currency  trade,  it  would  be  desirable  to  reduce  the  amount  of  the  agreements  over
time  to  avoid  a permanent  bias  in the  bilateral  aggregate  amount  of trade.  For
example,  in  the  initial  year  the  Soviet  Union  and  an  East  European  country  might
agree  to  purchase  $3  billion  worth  of  goods  and  services  in  each  other's  markets.
Trade  above  this  amount  would  be permitted,  but discretionary.  That  is,  the  $3
billion  would  be  the  minimum  amount  of  trade  between  the  two  countries,  but  there
is no guarantee  trade  above the $3 billion  would  be balanced.  In subsequent
years,  however,  the value of guaranteed  hard currency  purchases  between  the
9Such  arrangements  were in  place  in  Poland  in  1989 (see  Tarr (1990)  for  a
description  and  quantitative  assessment  of their  consequences),-are  now  in
place  in  Bulgaria  and  are  being  considered  by the  USSR.- 15 _
countries  would  be  reduced,  to  say  $2.5  billion  in  the  second  year  and  $2  bill-on
in the third  year and so on. Total  USSR purchases  of the country's  exports,
however,  might  not  decrease  in  any  year  if  discretionary  trade  increases.  In  this
manner,  the  aggregate  value  of trade  with the  Soviet  Union  and the  other  CMEA
countries  will become  market  determined  over  time,  and  allow  for  restructuring
of the  aggregate  amount  of trade  among  the  former  CMEA  countries  or toward  the
West.
Moving beyond such arrangements,  a system  which allows settlement  of
balances  in hard currency  would permit  trade  to be multilateral.  That is,  if
countries  agree to periodically  settle  their trade  balances in convertible
currencies,  then  trade  surpluses  earned  with  one  country  can  be  used  to  purchase
goods  anywhere  in the  world.  Thus,  interim  arrangements  for  countries  without
convertible  currencies  are  possible  that  permit  fully  multilateral  trade,  without
the  necessity  of a clearing  or payments  union.
Nonetheless,  given  that  currency  convertibility  is  being  introduced  at a
different  pace  in  different  countries,  and  significant  foreign  exchange  controls
continue  to be in place  in  most  of these  countries,  clearing  arrangements  with
short  settlement  periods,  i.e.,  up to three  months,  in foreign  exchange  can  be
useful  as a strictly  interim  measure.  They can provide some small  foreign
exchange  savings in transactions  costs and a means of monitoring  evolving
patterns  of  trade. Their  stimulus  to  trade,  as  in  previous  arrangements  of  this
kind  can  be  expected  to  be small. These  arrangements  can  be phased  out  as soon
as countries  achieve  a  modicum  of convertibility.  Such  arrangements  should  not
be confused  with the  proposal  that  some  have offered  to establish  a "clearing
dollar.' With this  proposal  trade  will be required  to be balanced  in dollars
with the  continuation  of intergovernmental  protocols  and state  obligations.- 16  -
inder  this  proposal  essentially  nlotltinle  would  change  except  that the  unit of
account  in  which  the  trade  is  conducted is  changed  to  the  dollar  and  prices  are
renegotiated  between  the  governments  at "world  market  levels."  In particular.
the  problem  of  hou  to redeem  a  TR surplus  could  potentially  be transformed  into
a  problem  of  how  to  redeem  a  clearing  dollar  surplus,  and  the  many  inefficiencies
of state  trading  remain.
It  is  of  course  conceivable  that  clearing  arrangements  could  be  considered
for  an entirely  different  reason  than that  considered  as their  main objective
in  the  past: namely,  clearing  mechanisms  could  be  used  not  to  expand  trade,  but
rather  to regulate  its  reduction  over time  and  thus  to cushion  the  adjustment
of firms  previously  oriented  to  CMEA  markets. Depending  on how  it  is  designed,
a  bilateral  clearing  arrangement  between  any  two  or  more  countries,  could  be  used
to insulate  and  protect  certain  industries  in each  country  from  international
competition. While such an arrangement  could  be used to ease transition  to
international  competition,  it  is  clearly  an inferior  alternative  to  other  means
of cushioning  the adjustment. Protection  through  clearing  arrangements  could
involve  non-tariff  barriers  and make the cost of protection  non-transparent.
Should a need arise to cushion  the adjustment  of sectors  to international
competition,  interim  and  declining  protection  should  be  provided  through  tariffs
and  subsidies.
V.  The  Role  of Enhanced  Credit  Arrangements:  General  Considerations
It  is widely  recognized that  simple clearing arrangements,  while
potentially  useful  as a transition  mechanism,  are  not  by themselves  likely  to
substantially  benefit  participants  or materially  affect  their trade.  Thus
proposals  for  clearing  arrangements  frequently  blend  into  proposals  for  enhancing_ 17  -
the  arrangements  through  some type  of short-medium  term cre.lit  c1&a-te-ti.'
of a payments  union.  Issues  of both feasibility  and desirability  arise in
considering the usefulness of such  proposals  for countries in East ant -entral
Europe.
A.  Mutual  Credit
In the  case  of a  payments  arrangement  with  mutual  credit,  the  fundamental
problem  is to discover  countries  willing  to become  creditors  within  the  union
in light  of the fact that they  are typically  large  debtors  in their  overall
balance  of payments. This is  precisely  the  problem  in  East-and  Central  Europe
today.
A country's  willingness  to  participate  in  a  payments  scheme  as  a  creditor
would  depend  on  the  likelihood  first,  that  its  position  as  a  creditor  within  the
group  might change  to debtor  and, second,  that its trade  would expand  more
rapidly  as a result  of the union.  Unless  reversals  in imbalances  occur as
anticipated,  there  is  no incentive  for  a creditor  country  to participate. 10
Unfortunately,  it appears  that trade-balance  reversals  are uncommon  in
trade  among  countries. In intra-CACM  trade  there  was only one trade-balance
reversal  among  the five  countries  in the five-year  period  from  1964 to 1969.
There  were a number  of reversals  in the  1970's. But in the  1980's  Nicaragua
\cloIf  all countries have similar probability assessments of which
cou  tries  will be the likely  creditors  and  debtors,  then  as long  as the  likely
creditor  has some  positive  orobability  of becoming  a debtor,  in  principle  it
is  possible  to  devise  complicated  credit  arrangements  (which  limit  the
exposure  of the  likely  creditor),  that  will provide  an incentive  for  all
countries  to  join.  See  Ethier  (1991)  for  an elaboration.  As mentioned  above,
however,  credit  arrangements  are  very  difficult  to  negotiate,  and  such
complications  may aggravate  those  difficulties.18  -
emerged  as  a large  pers  .stent  debtor  and  Costa  Rica  and  Guatemala  as  persistent
creditors  [The  World  Bank (1989)].
To some extent, reversal  in the existing  positions  can be ef.t.v-ted  by
provisions  guiding  the extension  of credit  and repayment.  In general,  two
approaches  can  be used: Repayments  can  be  based  on the  reversal  of  position  or
on  a prearranged  time  schedule.
The EPU  used the  first  approach. The procedure  was broadly  as follows:
Repayment  was  made  on  a  monthly  basis,  partly  in  cash  and  partly  in  the  form  of
credit  under  a  quota  system. (Originally,  a sliding  system  of cash  and  credit
was utilized,  to be changed later  on to a uniform  fifty-fifty  rate).  Any
payments  in excess  of the  quota  were settled  in cash --  with some  exceptions
relating  to  extreme  debit  or  credit  cases. Under  this  system,  a debtor  country
could  enjoy  continued  credit  for an indefinite  period  as long  as it remained
within  its  quota,  and  repayment  hinged  on  a  reversal  of  its  position. 11 The  same
applied  to creditors.  Such a system  spreads  the onus of adjustment  between
debtors  and  creditors,  but at the  same  time the  quotas  limit  to predetermined
amounts the credit that is extended  to or received  by any single country
[Michalopoulos  (1973)1.
The  alternative  method  requires  repayments  on the  basis  of a prearranged
timetable  irrespective  of position. A country  may end  up with large  negative
balances  in intra-group  trade  because  of exchange  rate  overvaluation  or other
ineffective  macroeconomic  policies. A prearranged  timetable  throws  the  onus  of
adjustment  more  heavily  on  the  debtor,  which  must  either  take  actions  that  force
11A description  of such  a settlement  scheme  for  Eastern  Europe  has  been
elaborated  by  W. Ethier  (1991).- 19 -
a reversal  within  the union  or gain a surplus  on trade  with the rest  of the
world.
The relative  feasibility  of these  approaches  depends  on the  cooperation
prevailing  among  the  members  of the  union. If there  is  considerable  agreement
between  debtors  and  creditors  on  general  economic  policy  questions  assuring  that
reversals  of  position  will  occur,  then  the  former  method  is  preferable. If,  on
the other  hand. such cooperati  - cannot  be assumed,  then the generally  more
demanding  terms  implicit  in  the  second  approach  may  have  to  be imposed  in  order
to reduce  the  amount  of credit  that  would  have to be extended  by participants
to persistent  debtors  within  the  union  [Michalopoulos  (1973)1.
Even if policy  coordination  is undertaken,  there is no guarantee  that
intra-group  trade  would  not leave  some  countries  with large  persistent  credit
or debit  positions. It  would  then  make  little  sense  for  a country  in  East  and
Central Europe to  participate  in a  payments arrangement  as a  creditor,
particularly  if such  a country,  though  a creditor  in the  union,  is an overall
debtor, requiring foreign transfers to  maintain a  satisfactory growth
performance.  Thus,  the  basic iroblem  of  a  payments  arrangement  for  intra-group
trade  and  payments  is  that  it focuses  on  only  a segment  of the  overall  balance
of trade  and  payments.  Since  surpluses  within  the  region  may  not  automatically
be  converted  for  the  purpose  of  importing  from  outside  the  region,  it  falls  short
of multilateral  trade.  It is for this reason  especially  that the idea of a
payments  union was abandoned in ESCAP.  It is also the reason for which
ultimately  the  CACG  clearing  arrangement  was  de  facto  suspended.  This  resulted
essentially  because  Nicaragua,  as a consequence  of ineffective  macroeconomic
policies,  ran large  deficits  in intra-group  trade,  which at the end of 1987
amounted  to over  $500  million. Costa  Rica  and  Guatemala  emerged  as persistent- 20 -
creditors  within  the  CACH  at  a  time  when  both  countries  faced  severe  balance  of
payments  and  debt  servicing  difficulties  in  their  overall  international  accounts.
Guatemala  in  1986  and  Costa  Rica in  1987  suspended  operations  with the  clearing
mechanism,  which  has  continued  in  existence  but  cleared  only  1  percent  of  intra-
regional  trade  in 1987 [The  World  Bank (1989)]. The CACM experience  is also
instructive  because  it  suggests  that  once  a  payments  arrangement  is  established,
the  pressure  by debtors  to raise  credit  ceilings  increases,  as do the  requests
by the  payments  union  for  outside  credit  to augment  available  resources. 12
In  order  to  avoid  the  problems  resulting  from  large  and  persistent  debtor
or credit  positions  and the need to finance  substantial  intra-regional,  as
opposed  to  global  deficits,  it  has  been  suggested  that  payments  arrangements  be
established  on  the  basis  of  initial  positions  (see  above). The  problem  is  that
in East and Central  Europe, it is precisely  the initial  trade positions  of
members  that  need to be changed  because  the  price  relations  on  which  they  are
based are distorted. Hence,  no payments  arrangements  based  on these  initial
positions  would  be desirable.
The  prospects  for  success  of a  payments  union  will grow if  the  creditors
anticipate  large  increases  in  their  exports  as  a result  of the  union. For  this
to occur,  however,  the  payments  union  must  either  be tied  to an agreement  that
obligates  participants  to undertake  tra'e  liberalization  over time  or provide
an incentive  to undertake  trade liberalization. This is a very important
condition  which,  if  not  fulfilled,  is  likely  to render  any  payments  arrangement
12In response  to such  requests,  the  European  Commission  approved  a new
credit  to the  CACH  amounting  to  120  million  ECUs  tranched  over  three  years.
This  credit  is intended  to support  future  trade  expansion  among  these
countries  but  not  to settle  past  balances  [European  Commission  (1989)).  As of
the  fall  of 1990,  it  has  not  become  operative  as it requires  approval  by three
of the  CACH  members  which  had  not  yet  been  obtained.- 21 -
inoperative.  It  should  be  recalled  in  this  context  that  the  EPU  which  expressly
tied to a code of liberalization  of intra-European  trade  to  which  members  had
to  accede,  if  they  were to  participate  in  the  payments  arrangements.  This  code
involved  commitments  to eliminate  all quantitative  restrictions  over a five-
year period, as well as other measures facilitating  intra-European  trade.
However,  greater trade liberalization  within the region  than is undertaken
externally  would induce  some costly  trade  diversion.  In addition,  given  the
desire  of  East  and  Central  European  countries  to  increase  their  trade  integration
with the rest of the world,  a payments  arrangement  which focuses  on intra-
regional  trade  expansion  (diversion)  would  be  moving  precisely  in  the  opposite
direction.
Perhaps  more  important  than  the  EPU  code  itself  were  the  initial  conditions
that prevailed  in Western  Europe  at the  time of its forniation.  A network  of
bilateral  credit  arrangements  among  Western  European  countries  evolved  over  time
into  a situation  where  most  countries  were in debt to some  countries,  but  had
credit  with others. Such a  situation  provides  an incentive  for bilateral
discrimination  in  trade.  For  example,  suppose  country  A is  a  creditor  to  country
B. but country  A is  also  be a  debtor  to country  C. This  situation  provides  an
incentive  to  country  A to  impose  trade  barriers  against  the  imports  from  country
C in favor  of imports  from  country  B. Importing  from  country  B allows  country
A to import  at less  than the full  cost  of the  goods  and services  imported  by
reducing  its  credits  to country  B; but importing  from  country  C involves  full
payment  of convertible  currency  or goods.
Without  a  network  of  bilateral  credit  and  debit  positions,  a  country  facing
a convertible  currency  deficit  gains  equally  from reducing  imports  from any
country.  A dollar's  worth of imports  from country  B is worth the same as a- 22 -
dollar's  worth of imports  from  country  C. It therefore  has no incentive  to
discriminate  in its trade  barriers.  A nonconvertible  currency  country  will in
general  impose  trade  barriers  including  foreign  exchange  rationing,  but there
is  no  marginal  gain  from  rationing  against  countries  in  which  it  runs  a  bilateral
deficit.
The EPU removed  the  incentive  to impose  country  specific  trade  barriers
because  credit  or debit  positions  are defined  regionally  within  the payments
union.  In East  and  Central  Europe,  however,  at the  beginning  of 1991,  there  is
no network  of significant  debit  or  credit  positions  among  the  countries.  Thus,
the East and Central European  countries  have no incentive  to oilaterally
discriminate  in their  trade  with each  other,  and the  initial  conditions  which
were important  to the  success  of the  EPU  in reducing  trade  barriers  are  absent
in East and Central  Europe. The Western  European  experience  does indicate,
however,  that  it is important  to limit  extensive  bilateral  credit  arrangements
because  they  may  evolve  into  an excessively  regulated  pattern  of trade.
B.  The  Role  of Outside  Assistance
The usefulness  or desirability  of outside participation  in payments
arrangements  varies  considerably  with  the  nature  of  the  arrangement.  In  clearing
arrangements,  strictly  defined,  foreign  participation  is  not  needed;  participants
can  and  have  easily  extended  the  necessary  amount  of  short  term  credit. Foreign
participation  has  not  been  sought  for  clearing  arrangements  in  the  past,  nor  did
its absence  appear to be a serious inhibition  of the creation  of others.
However,  the situation  is quite different  with regard  to payments  unions.
Foreign  participation  has been considered  crucial  to their  establishment  and- 23 -
successful  operation. It  has often  been  pointed  out that  the  EPU success  was
made  possible  in  part  because  of  the  original  U.S.  grant  of  $100  million,  which
helped  the  union  to  deal  with the  problem  of persistent  debtors. Outside  aide
eases  the  problem  of financing  credit  positions  within  the  union. Aid  funds  can
pay creditors  in part or in full,  while a certain  amount  of credit  can be
extended  to  the  other  participants.  The  incentive  for  a  creditor  to  participate
would then be the clear benefits  that it would derive  from potential  trade
expansion  resulting  from  the  union.
A basic  issue  raised  by a payments  union  with outside  credit  relates  to
the  criteria  for  allocating  the  credit. If there  are  persistent  debtors,  then
one group of countries  enjoys  the benefits  of the outside  credit,  implying
transfers  of resources,  while  the  other  group  benefits  only  to the  extent  that
their  exports  increase  as a result  of the union.  A fundamental  problem  is
whether  or  not  the  allocation  of  aid  funds  by  a  payments  union  is  rational.  The
debtors,  whoever they are, get credit automatically  according to certain
prespecified  rules  whose stringency  can vary with the amount  of credit  they
request.  The  extension  of  credit  relates  to  a  balance-of-payments  position  with
respect  to the  region  and  not to  the  world  as a  whole,  and  yet  it is  the  latter
and not the former  that should  be considered  when assistance  is extended  on
balance-of-payments  grounds,  as  it  is  in  the  context  of  an  IMF  standby  or  a  World
Bank  structural  adjustment  loan.  More importantly,  it  may  be the  case  that  the
use  of this  credit  is  the  result  of inappropriate  macroeconomic  policies,  such
as overvalued  exchange  rates,  in  which case the aid  will go to countries  in
inverse  proportion  to  desirable  reform  policies._ 24 -
VI.  Enhanced  Credit  Arrangements  for  East  and  Central  Europe
Let  us  now  look  at the  question  of setting  up a  clearing  arrangement  with
more than  interim  credit  and  foreign  participation  in  East  and  Central  Europe.
Let us first  consider  the  alternative  that  the  arrangement  is limited  only to
the East and Central  European  countries  (excluding  the USSR).  Under such
circumstances  it would appear  undesirable  to provide  external  support  (from
outside  the  union  and  in  particular  from  Europe  or  OECD  countries)  for  a  payments
arrangement  that  provides  interim  credit  for  trade  balances  within  the  region.
Indeed,  it  would  be  counter-productive,  as  provision  of  such  credit  would  reduce
the  incentive  for  reorienting  trade  towards  the  rest  of  the  world  and  in  any  case
the beneficiary  countries  would be chosen  arbitrarily  irrespective  of their
economic  policies  and  on  the  basis  of  whether  or  not  they  have  a  negative  balance
within  the  region  --  which  in  and  of itself  is  of little  economic  significance.
Suppose  however,  that  the USSR  were to participate  and provide  credit.
Again,  no external  support  from  outside  the  group  would  be justified  for the
reasons  discussed  above.  The question  is whether such  an arrangement  could
nevertheless  make a contribution  to easing  the  cost  of adjustment  in  East and
Central  Europe  associated  with  the  anticipated  terms-of-trade  loss  vis-&-vis  the
USSR  resulting  from  denominating  all  trade  of these  countries  at international
prices.
It should  be clear  that  no concrete  proposal  to  this  effect  has  been  made
by the  USSR.  Thus,  we are simply  considering  a hypothetical  situation  under
which the  USSR  would  agree:  (a)  to  participate  in  a payments  arrangement  with
East  and  Central  European  countries;  and (b)  that  if East  and  Central  European
countries  developed  negative  balances  in  intra-group  trade,  the  USSR  would  agree- 25  -
to finance  these  balances  on an interim  basis,  in full  or in part,  based for
example  on a  quota,  as in the  EPU.
Clearly,  any  assistance  provided  by the  USSR  to  East  and  Central  European
countries  to  ease  possible  terms-of-trade  losses  associated  with  the  dissolution
of the  CMEA  could  be  helpful. From  the  standpoint  of  East  and  Central  European
countries,  such  an arrangement  could  be helpful  in financing  deficits  with the
USSR,  which  are  likely  to  arise  in the  short  run  due  to the  signifieant  terms-
of-trade  loss  they  will  suffer  vis-a-vis  the  USSR. Since,  the  USSR  is  not  likely
to be willing to finance  unlimited  deficits,  presumably  some credit limits
(quotas)  would  need to be imposed. The allocation  of credit  (from  the  USSR)
would  be  inefficient  as  it  would  again  be  guided  by intra-group  payments  balances
--  which  would include,  in  addition  to payments  resulting  from  terms-of-trade
losses  with the  USSR,  other  factors  that  affect  intra-group  trade.  On the  other
hand, Marrese and Vanous (1983)  have argued that the USSR had political
objectives  in  East  and  Central  Europe  that  induced  it  to  subsidize  its  trade  with
its  East  and  Central  European  regional  trading  partners.  It is  unclear  whether
such  objectives  remain.  The desire  of the USSR to withdraw  from the CMEA
framework  was in part  motivated  by its  unwillingness  to continue  to subsidize
this  trade.  Moreover,  the  Soviet  subsidies  never  bought  the  political  allegiance
of the  citizens  of East and  Central  Europe. 13 Finally,  USSR  aid to a payments
union  would  be  an inefficient  way of  obtaining  political  allegiance  relative  to
bilateral  aid.
In  sum,  a  payments  arrangement  with  credit  from  the  USSR  could  be  obviously
of assistance  in  easing  the  adjustment  to  a  potential  terms-of-trade  loss;  but,
13See  Balassa  (1990),  Oblath  and  Tarr (1991)  and  Brada (1988)  for
elaborations  of this  argument.- 26 -
as the  multiagency  task  force  study  of the  USSR has  noted [see  International
Monetary  Fund et al. (1991,  p. 30)], if the USSR is willing to provide  such
credit, it would be more advantageous  to the USSR if it were to provide  it
directly  in the form of an export  credit  arrangement.  Such an arrangement,
especially  in the  area  of capital  goods,  would facilitate  its  own exports.  in
competition  with  Western  exports.
An alternate  arrangement  has been elaborated  by Ethier (1991).  He
describes  the  establishment  of  a  clearing  arrangement  with  credit  (either  mutual
or augmented  by outside  resources)  in which trade  with the Soviet  Union is
included  in calculating  the settlement  balances  of East and Central  European
members  but  the  Soviet  Union  does  not receive  or  provide  credit.
The inclusion  of trade  with the  USSR deals,  at least  in  part,  with the
criticism  that  payments  arrangements  for  East  and Central  Europe  that  exclude
the  Soviet  Union  provide  financing  for  deficits  that  arise  in-an  extremely  small
and  arbitrarily  segmented  part  of  the  total  trade  of  the  participating  countries.
Inclusion  of USSR trade,  however,  would still result in the provision of
automatic  financing  of a component  of total  trade,  regardless  of the country
policies  that give rise to the deficit, and as such is subject  to the same
criticism  that  the  resulting  allocation  of  credit  is  not efficient.
Inclusion  of trade  with Soviet  Union  also  gives  rise  to the  question  of
what would be the ensuing pattern  of payments  and incentives  of different
countries  in  participating.  Two  alternatives  can  be  envisaged: first,  that  all
the  East  and  Central  European  countries  would  end  up in  a  net  deficit  position;
alternatively  that  some  will  be  creditors  and  some  debtors.  If  the  first  outcome
obtains (as is widely expected),  then the question  is why set up such an
arrangement  in the  first  place.  Provision  of outside  credit,  presumably  from- 27 -
the  EC or  other  donors,  would  provide  for  financing  of deficits  with the  Soviet
Union  with  the  latter  not  bearing  any  of  the  financing  burden. It  is  argued  that
if  this  outcome  obtains,  the  clearing  arrangement  would  permit  East  and  Cenutal
European  countries  to  present  a  united  front  against  the  Soviet  Union. But,  if
the objective  is to present  a united  front  by East European  governments,  why
cloud  the  picture  by  creating  an  arrangement  that  includes  trade  with  each  other?
In the unlikely  event that an East and Central  European  country  is a
creditor  in such an arrangement,  it is argued that it may  still find it
attractive  to join,  because  the  alternative  may  be  a  bilateral  surplus  with  the
Soviet  Union,  which  would  be unacceptable  to the  Soviet  Union.  It is  assumed,
that  the  Soviet  Union  would  wish  to  maintain  bilaterally  balanced  trade  with  all
its  trade  partners  and  that  as result  would  force  a potential  surplus  country
to  cut  back  its  exports  to the  USSR  market. A creditor  in  this  arrangement,  it
is  argued,  would  find  it  more  advantageous  to  provide  such  credit  to the  Union
as a whole,  because  the alternative  would  be a reduction  in its exports  and
economic  activity.  The  rationale  for  USSR  discrimination  is  not  well  elaborated,
however,  because  as  argued  above,  any  country,  including  the  Soviet  Union,  has
no incentive  to  bilaterally  balance  or  bilaterally  discriminate  in  trade  before
it  has developed  a network  of credit  and  debit  positions.  That situation  does
not  presently  characterize  East  and  Central  European  trade.- 28 -
VII.  Conclusions
The  analysis  leads  to the  following  conclusions  about  trade  and  payments
arrangements  among countries  of East and Central  Europe  in the light  of the
dissolution  of the  CMEA.
1.  The  fundamental  reforms  recommended  for  the  trade  regime  would  allow  East
and Central  European  enterprises  autonomy  to directly  conclude  contracts-  with
foreign  firms  (or  other  authorized  agents)  in  the  former  CMEA  countries,  be  under
no state  obligation,  and  bear the  risk  of their  contracts.  Moreover,  the role
of licenses  and  price  equalization  would  be  minimized  or eliminated  and  foreign
trading  organizations  would  not  enjoy  monopoly  trading  privileges.  Trade  would
be conducted  according  to  world  prices  and  denominated  and  settled  in  dollars.
2.  The  commitments  of  these  countries  to  introduce  competitive  exchange  rates
and  a degree  of convertibility  should  be strongly  encouraged.  The  achievement
of even less than full  convertibility  will be uneven,  and some  countries,  in
particular  the  USSR  may  lag  behind. In  such  circumstances,  clearing  arrangements
with short  settlement  periods,  i.e.,  less  than  three  months,  with some  of the
laggards  may  be a  useful  interim  measure;  and  they  are  to  be strongly  preferred
over  a system  in  which  bilateral  balancing  of trade  is forced;  but  they  can  be
established  without  outside  contributions.
3.  Clearing  and  payments  arrangements  have  been  useful  in  circumstances  where
there  is  a network  of existing  bilateral  credit  arrangements  that  have led  to
bilateral  trade  discrimination  or  where  the  objective  of  participating  countries- 29 _
is  to increase  mutual  trade. This  is  not  the  case  in  East  and  Central  European
countries  today  where  as they  emerge  from  the  CMEA  they  have  only small  debts
to each  other  and  where the  focus  is on  better  integration  of their  economies
in  the  worldwide  trading  system. Clearing  arrangements  can  also  be designed  in
ways  that  provide  protection.  When  such  interim  arrangements  in  East  and  Central
Europe  are concluded,  it is important  that they do not become  vehicles  for
continued  protection.
4.  Payments  arrangements  involving  credit  face  insuperable  problems  when  the
credit  is to be provided  solely  by the  participating  members. Outside  credit
can  be  helpful  in  overcoming  some  of  these  problems. But  the  allocation  of  such
credit  is  inefficient  because  it  automatically  assists  countries  in  the  financing
of intra-regional  balances,  which in and of themselves  have little  economic
justification  and  could  result  primarily  from  ineffective  macroeconomic  policies
of  participants. On these grounds,  provision  of outside  credit  to support
payments arrangements  among East and  Central European countries is  not
recommended  whether  such  arrangements  include  or exclude  the  Soviet  Union.- 30 -
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